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NOTES AND COMMENTS
of either party, or divorce by an action brought by a spouse, admittedly
guilty of marital offenses. 22
The doctrine of recrimination is hard to defend from a social view
point. It prevents the dissolution of the marital status of parties
whose conduct is admittedly unfavorable to a successful marriage.23
Where one party violates his marital duties the remedy of divorce is
granted.24
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
SUITS AGAINST THE STATE
Petitioner, non-resident Foreign manufacturing corporation, seeks
a refund of gross income taxes from the board of the department
of treasury' of the State of Indiana.2 The taxes were claimed to have
been derived from sales occurring in Indiana;3 petitioner alleged
violation of the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.4 United States District Court denied
recovery. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 5  Certiorari granted.6
Held, complaint dismissed. The consent of the State of Indiana t6
suit for a tax refund in the state court does not extend to suit in a
federal court.7 No decision on the merits. Ford Motor Co. v. Depart-
ment of Treasury of State of Indiana, et al., 65 Sup Ct. 347 (1945).
Petitioner's right to maintain this action in federal court depends
on (1) whether the action is against the individual or the state, and
(2) if against the state, whether the state has consented to suit in
22. Silving, "Divorce Without Fault" (1944) 29 Iowa L. Rev. 527.
23. See Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff, 144 F. (2d) 509 (1944), cited supra
note 17.
24. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §3-1201; Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1943 Replacement) §3-1201.
1. The action is brought against the department of treasury of the
State of Indiana, and M. Clifford Townsend, Joseph M. Robertson,
and Frank G. Thompson, the Governor, Treasurer, and Auditor, re-
spectively, of the State of Indiana, who together constituted the
board of the department of treasury, as provided by Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) §64-2614. See Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1943 Replacement) § 60-101.
2. Petitioner followed the statutory procedure for obtaining a re-
fund as set forth in hid. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement)
§64-2614 (a).
3. Indiana claimed the taxes under Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943
Replacement) § 64-2602.
4. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of State of Indiana
et al., 141 F. (2d) 24 (C.C.A. 7th, 1944).
6. Id at 322 U.S. 721 (1944).
7. The suit was barred by U.S. Const. Amend. XI, "The judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens
or subjects of any foreign state." See Hyneman, "Judicial In-




federal court. If against an individual, a remedy is allowed against
the wrongdoer personally.8 Where the action is against a state of-
ficer in his official capacity, constituting an action against the state,9
the express constitutional limitation of the Eleventh Amendment oper-
ates as a bar,'0 unless waived." Petitioner's suit constitutes an action
against the state.12
A provision of a state tax refund statute, similar to the statute
in Indiana, was held a waiver of state immunity from suit in a state
court only.13 The Indiana Attorney General appeared in the Federal
District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals and defended on the merits,
objecting for the first time in the Supreme Court. Respondents con-
cede that if it is within the power of administrative and executive
8. The Eleventh Amendment allows no protection in this situation.
Atchison, T., and S. F. Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280, 287 (1912);
Mathews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 528 (1932).
9. The nature of a suit as one against the state is to be determined
by the essential nature and effect of the proceeding. Worcester
County Trust Co. v. Riley, Controller of California, 302 U.S. 292,
296 (1937); Ex Parte in the Matter of the State of New York
et al., Petitioner, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921); In Re Ayers, 123
U.S. 443, 488 (1887). These actions are ordinarily authorized by
statute.
10. The state is the real substantial party in interest and may invoke
its sovereign immunity even though individual officials are nominal
defendants. Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47,
53 (1944); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 440 (1900).
11. The immunity may be waived. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, 200
U.S. 273, 284 (1906) (ancillary proceeding where defendant South
Carolina attempted to attack validity of the Pegues judgment(Humphrey v. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244 (U.S. 1872) which had been
defended on the merits, after twenty years had elapsed, with a
South Carolina statute conferring on the attorney general power
to "stand in judgment for the state."); Clark v. Barnard, 108
U.S. 436, 447 (1883) (a voluntary proceeding in intervention);
Missouri v. Fiske, 200 U.S. 18, 24 (1905) (intervention proceed-
ing). These cases indicate that something more is required for
a waiver than is found in the instant case.
12. Petitioner brings the action under strict compliance with Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replacement) § 64-2614(a). Any judgment
which might be obtained in such an action is satisfied by pay-
ment "out of any funds in the state treasury." This statute
clearly provides for action against the state through its collective
representatives, instead of one against the collecting officials
themselves.
13. "When we are dealing with the sovereign exemption from judicial
interference in the vital field of financial administration a clear
declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems
to other courts than those of its own creation must be found."
Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944) at
p. 54, cited supra note 10. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replace-
ment) §64-2614(a) provides for refund in "circuit or superior
court of the county in which the taxpayer resides or is located."
Reference to a particular state court in a similar California stat-
ute warranted an inference that the state legislature consented
to suit in state court only. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441
(1899). See Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 4-1501 for a like
provision in case of a contract liability.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
officers to waive, they have done so.14 The Indiana Attorney General
exercises only the power delegated him by statute,15 and does not pos-
sess powers of an attorney general at common law;16 therefore there
is no waiver of the state's immunity.
A collateral issue raised by the instant case is the difference
in controlling rules regarding application of the Eleventh Amendment
when the action is for injunctive relief in equity rather than an
action at law as presented in the principal case. Ever since Ex
Parte Young 17 it is well settled that federal courts may enjoin pro-
ceedings in state courts to enforce statutes repugnant to the Federal
Constitution,18 and suits against state officers to enjoin enforcement
of statutes contravening the Federal Constitution are held not suits
against the state for the purposes of this particular rule.' 9 As a
14. The Indiana Const. Art. IV, § 24 prohibits state consent to suit
in any one particular case without a general consent to suit in
all similar causes of action. "Since the state legislature may
waive state immunity only by general law, it is not to be pre-
sumed in the absence of clear language to the contrary, that they
conferred on administrative or executive officers discretionary
power to grant or withhold consent in individual cases." Prin-
cipal case at 352.
15. For powers delegated to Indiana Attorney General, see Ind. Stat.
Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 4-1501 and § 49-1902.- Provision for the
attorney general in the instant case is made in Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1943 Replacement) § 64-2614(c).
16. State ex rel. Bingham v. Home Brewing Co., 182 Ind. 75, 93, 105
N.E. 909, 915 (1914); Julian v. State, 122 Ind. 68, 73, 23 N.E. 690,
692 (1890). An appearance by an attorney general will not bind
the state unless he is given authority by state laws to waive the
immunity. O'Connor v. Slaker, 22 F. (2d) 147, 152 (1927).
17. 209 U.S. 123 (1907), 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 932 (1908). See Note
(1908) 21 Harv. L. Rev. 527.
18. The federal circuit court in Ex Parte Young had enjoined the
Minnesota Attorney-General from proceeding under railroad rate
statutes pending decision of their constitutionality. He disobeyed
the injunction and his habeus corpus petition was dismissed. The
court found (1) the statutes were unconstitutional and (2) the
court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction. Accord, Wells
Fargo and Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920); Truax v. Reich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915); Smythe v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898);
Reagan v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
Dobie, "Federal Procedure" (1928) at p. 679 propounds this view.
Cf. North Carolina v. Southern Ry., 145 N.C. 495, 59 S.E. 570(1907), 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 966 (1908); In Re Ayers, 123 U.S. 433
(1887); La. ex rel. v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
19. Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls
Stockyards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537
(1903); Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369 (1916). The opposite view
was clearly expressed by Mr. Justice Harland dissenting in the
Young case, Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1907), cited supra note
18, at p. 173, "And the manifest-indeed the avowed and admitted
-object of seeking such relief was to tie the hands of the state,
so that it could not in any manner or by any mode of proceeding
in its own courts test the validity of the statutes and orders
in question. It would therefore seem clear that within the true
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment the suit brought in the fed-
eral court was one, in legal effect, against the state." Consider-
19451
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
matter of comity, federal courts ought not to issue an injunction
until the party has exhausted the right of appeal in the state,20 but
the doctrine is inapplicable if, pending an appeal, the party would
suffer losses for which there is not adequate compensation at law.21 To
further limit excessive use of the power, Congress provided that such
injunction could only be issued by three-judge courts.22
It is suggested that injunctive relief was not asked for in the
principal case because (1) the claim of unconstitutionality was a sec-
ondary one,23 and (2) the Indiana statute had no penalizing features
able confusion seems to have arisen as to whether the Eleventh
Amendment operates as a bar in this particular situation, and
many authorities agree it to be an uncomfortably close question.
Trickett, "Suits Against States by Individuals In Federal Courts"
(1907) 41 Am. L. Rev. 364 at 383 says, "A survey of the cases,
and of the reasonings of the courts too painfully discloses the
absence of a clear and definite criterion for deciding when a suit
is to be deemed a suit against a state." " . . . and suits by
these officers are enjoined at the instance of individuals, surely
this is perilously close to the evil which the Eleventh Amendment
sought to avert." Dobie, "Federal Procedure" (1928) 537.
20. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 228 (1908)
(where a state commission was fixing the alleged unconstitutional
rates) ; Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159
(1920) (a public utility attempting to enjoin a commission from
changing its rate schedule); Pullman Co. v. Railroad Comm. of
Texas, 33 F. Supp, 675 (W.D. Tex. 1940) (injunction sought
against an order of Ry. Commission of Texas). Cf Public Utilities
Comm. of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943), Note
(1943) 56 Harv. L. Rev. 825. With reference to a tax statute, fed-
eral courts ordinarily will not enjoin state officers from collecting
taxes where the taxpayer has an adequate remedy at state law.
Mathews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 526 (1932).
21. Pacific Tel. and Tel. Co. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196 (1924);
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290 (1923). In
the words of Mr. Justice Holmes in Massachusetts State Grange
v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525 (1926) at p. 527, " . . . no injunction
ought to issue against officers of a state clothed with authority
to enforce the law in question, unless in a case reasonably free
from doubt and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable
injury." See Lockwood, Maw, and Rosenberry, "The Use of the
Federal Injunction" (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 426 at 433-436 for
a discussion of necessary elements before a tax statute leaves
open the way to federal injunction.
22. 36 Stat. 557 (1910), 28 U.S.C.A. §380 (1928). Congress also
enunciated the common law at 50 Stat. 738 (1937), 28 U.S.C.A.§ 41 (1928), which sanctioned federal court practice by forbidding
district courts to enjoin state action when there was an adequate
remedy at law available. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v.
Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943), discussed in Note (1943) 43 Col. L.
Rev. 837, 871, gives a most recent interpretation of the federal
statutes, in this case allowing the injunction to restrain collection
of illegal taxes from maritime employees.
23. In the Circuit Court of Appeals, 141 F. (2d) 24 (1944), petitioner's
main contention was that the income taxed did not derive from
sources in the State of Indiana; the claim of unconstitutionality




giving the petitioner an inadequate legal remedy.24 By this decision,
the operation of Indiana's immunity is not precluded by the mere
joining of nominal defendants and Indiana courts must pass initially
on Indiana's liability for tax refunds.25
INSURANCE
DEATH BY ACCIDENTAL MEANS
Beneficiaries sued on the double indemnity clause of a policy
insuring their mother. The clause covered a death occurring "as a
result directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries,
effected solely through external, violent, and accidental means." Dece-
dent fell while entering a bathroom, suffered a broken hip, hydrostatic
pneumonia developed, and death resulted. Prior to her fall, the in-
sured had been bedfast because of chronic nephritis, hypertension, and
coronary sclerosis. Decedent's physician testified that death could have
been independent of her physical illness and except for a broken hip
and resulting pneumonia, she might have lived for several years.
Judgments of the trial and appellate courts1 for plaintiffs reversed
and remanded because beneficiaries failed to prove that death occurred
as a result of bodily injuries effected solely through accidental means.
Prudential Insurance Co. of Ainerica v. Van Wey et al., - Ind. -
59 N.E. (2d) 421 (1945).
Indiana is in accord with the majority rule that burden of proof
is on the plaintiff to show not only that injury or death was caused
by accidental means, but also that it was not caused by pre-existing
disease or bodily infirmity.2
The introduction of the phrase "accidental means" in the double
24. Indiana legislators appear to have realized the possibility of
intervention by the federal court and therefore established no
basis for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the federal
court when they enacted Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1943 Replace-
ment) 64-2614. As suggested by Warren, "Federal and State
Court Interference" 43 Harv. L. Rev. 345, 377, it lies with each
state itself to eliminate this source of friction with the federal
authority. Justice Frankfurter, "The Federal Court" (1929) 58
New Republic 273, 275, is in accord. Statutory construction of
the statute in question finds that Indiana has followed this well-
guided approach to the problem.
25. Of course, final recourse to federal courts is not foreclosed. "
the construction given the Indiana statute leaves open the road to
review in this court on constitutional grounds after the issues
have been passed upon by state courts." Principal case at 353.
1. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Van Wey et al., - Ind. App.
-, 56 N.E. (2) 509 (1944). Lower courts found pneumonia
resulting from the fall was the proximate cause of death. Dissent
in principal case concurs in that proximate cause of death deter-
mines liability. The cause was transferred from the Appellate
Court under Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §4-215.
2. Orey v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 215 Ind.
305, 307, 19 N.E. (2d) 547, 548 (1939); Police & Fireman's Ins.
Asso. v. Blunk, 107 Ind. App. 279, 285, 20 N.E. (2d) 660, 663
(1939); Note (1943) 144 A.L.R. 1416.
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